The U.S. Army's Role in Afghanistan: a paradigm shift

The U.S. Army is changing. All battles cannot be won by force alone, argued Rohde (2007). A paradigm shift is taking place where fire power has dominated the military culture. Places like Afghanistan poses various challenges for the U.S. forces that were not quite understood or known before. The local culture must be learned and the locals must me engaged.

Rohde (2007) mentioned that the Army has begun to examine the war in Afghanistan from “human” point of view. “We are not focused on the enemy. We’re focused on bringing down governance to the people.”

The venerable institution has recruited anthropologist and social scientists to replace where M-16s won’t get the job done. These social scientists are responsible for enhancing “military operations and strategy.” For example, the army personnel now work with local tribal councils or jirgas to establish a strategic link between the local community and the armed forces.

The Army is also working to improve the economic conditions of the communities in Afghanistan. According to Atran (2004), poverty is one of the leading reasons among the insurgents and youth to become so-called terrorist.

The Foreign Affairs reported that the Army is no longer focusing on the war in Afghanistan on political and social issues. It is now undertaking to focus on the economic factors, a notion known as “expeditionary economics.”

According to The Foreign Affairs, this theory offers post-war strategy to rebuild war-torn nations and to facilitate international aid to promote economic growth. The economic factor is central to the success of this theory. Atran (2004) noted that the root causes of terrorism stem from poverty, social dysfunction, and inadequate education.

Rohde (2007) illustrated a brilliant example where economic distress is directly related to insurgency. Many widows in Afghanistan’s remote villages are economically distressed. This puts pressure on the sons of many of these widows to join insurgency because of monetary incentives offered by the local insurgents.

The paradigm shift offers a solid bridge between the insertions of social scientists into war zone and resolving economic and social crisis in Afghanistan. This will also help rebuild the war-torn country’s political structure. A recent report by Seth Johns of The Foreign Affairs supports what Rohde describes in his article about Army’s cooperation with the local tribes or jirgas.

Johns (2010) said that building a central government in Afghanistan alone will further destabilize the country. It must be aligned with decentralized form of power among the tribal leaders. The former is a top-down approach and the latter is a bottom-up approach. To achieve balance in Afghanistan’s governance, both must be installed.

Bernard Lewis (1995) concluded in his article nearly two decades ago that “something deeper” is in the works within the roots of Islamic terrorism. The idea of resolving poverty through innovative policy and retooling existing U.S. institutions might have just unearthed Lewis’ unfounded “something deeper.”